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The global automotive industry has been exposed to an overproduction crisis for several dec-
ades. Under the pressure of restructuring, automotive companies renew both the geographical scope 
and the technological standardization of their production processes. We analyze the effects this re-
structuring had on the development of European economies in order to understand whether vertical 
specializations in the automotive value chain can lead to Central and Eastern European countries’ 
catching up to advanced economies, or whether such specializations reproduce new forms of core–
periphery relations. In order to answer this question, we introduce a new methodological approach 
to understand vertical specialization in the global value chain from a semi-peripheral perspective. 
We combine the theory of global value chains with Vernon’s product life-cycle theory. In the re-
search we focus on the standardization of the production of electric engines behind the geographical 
relocation of production between core and periphery.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have experienced 
major industrial restructuring, the process of which has been intensified by the re-
location of production from advanced economies. CEE has provided production 
sites with low wages, flexible labor regulations, and tax incentives for companies 
in search of new opportunities to adapt to the dire global market conditions. The 
significance of the automotive industry is demonstrated by their share in these 
countries’ industrial output.
Since the early 2000s, fierce market competition has forced automotive com-
panies to expand the geographical scope of their production networks, and also 
to keep production costs under control. This has triggered vertical specialization 
in the European automotive value chains. At the top of the value chain hierar-
chy, companies have remained geographically concentrated in Western Europe, 
whereas those who specialized in more standardized activities have transferred 
production to Eastern Europe (see the increasing production of cars in the region 
shown in Figure 1). 
Our hypothesis is that the emerging hierarchy of vertical specialization in 
value chains corresponds to the core–periphery relationship. In this paper we will 
analyze the economic mechanisms that reproduce core–peripheral hierarchies in 
the value chain context. Furthermore, we will examine their broader social con-
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Figure 1. Car production in Central and Eastern Europe, 1989–2017
Source: authors, based on the OICA database.
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sequences on CEE countries which are historically on the European periphery. 
We argue that standardization of production and technologies in production, es-
pecially when standardization decelerates, are the major forces that cause reloca-
tion. As a consequence, despite the advancements in technological capabilities in 
peripheral production, the value added capacity does not automatically improve; 
in fact, diminishing capacity for producing added value can be the result of spe-
cialization entailed by standardized technologies.
In order to analyze core–periphery relationships of vertical specialization in the 
automotive industry, we have combined the framework(s) of global value chains 
and production networks (GVC/GPN) with Vernon’s product life-cycle theory. 
On the one hand, the GVC/GPN framework stresses the geographical aspects of 
value- chain governance. On the other hand, product life-cycle theory explains how 
different forms of rent are made possible by the standardization of production. Al-
though relocation in the automotive industry had already started at the beginning 
of the 1990s, and has been triggered by different economic forces since then, in 
this paper we will focus on one major global force which has become more pro-
nounced since the world economic crisis in 2008. Technological transformation 
has become one of the main driving forces for relocating standardized technology 
for the production of combustion engines. We argue that the crisis was a major 
turning point in the life-cycle of combustion engines as they entered into the ma-
turity phase. The declining phase in the life cycle of combustion engines intersects 
with the acceleration of the standardization of electric engines, which therefore 
becomes more substitutive to the combustion engine. In order to analyze the in-
tersection between their life-cycles and the effects they have on the geographical 
relocation of production, we apply Vernon’s theory to two substitutive products.2
Most studies analyzing Central and Eastern Europe’s economic dependence 
concentrate exclusively on interstate economic relations. And while world-sys-
tem scholars have traced the core–periphery relationship to different nodes of the 
world economy, including regional and inter-firm levels, the intrinsic linkages 
between these various levels and the mechanisms through which the multiscale 
system operates continue to be underexplored. The methodological aim of our pa-
per is to establish a clear set of links between the global and local levels of the in-
ternational division of labor in order to examine the question of dependency from 
the broadest possible perspective. By exploring the links between these different 
2  Technological innovation is driven not only by electric cars’ engines, but also by their batter-
ies. In the following paper, we regard the two components as technologically inseparable ele-
ments of a complex powertrain; economically, however, we will treat them separately, given 
that batteries are often supplied by different firms, in some cases competitors of those firms 
that develop electric engines.
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levels of the system, we intend to describe the ways in which macro-structural 
dependencies are produced and reproduced by interfirm relationships within the 
production process.
The theory of dependency is nothing new; it dates back to the interwar and 
immediate post-war developmental concepts of scholars in Latin American and 
certain Western and Eastern European countries (Cardoso 1972; Gereffi – Evans 
1981; Weissenbacher 2018). More recently, scholars in the tradition of Critical 
Political Economy have introduced the concept of the dependent market econ-
omy, which combines the notion of dependency with analyses of the role of the 
state in different varieties of capitalism (Bohle – Greskovits 2012; Vliegenthart 
2010; Nölke 2016; Becker 2016). Proponents of the ‘varieties of capitalism’ ap-
proach have thoroughly studied the expanding role of foreign manufacturers in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Šćepanović 2013; Bernaciak 2011), while other in-
stitutionalists—for instance, analysts of regulation such as those of GERPISA—
have focused more on ‘work models’ and institutional compromises in the auto-
motive industry (Boyer – Freyssenet 2002; Krzywdzinski 2008).
Unlike institutionalists’ models of the ‘varieties of capitalism,’ structural Marx-
ists’ analyses have long emphasized the uneven and combined development ex-
hibited by the ‘new international division of labor’ (Fröbel et al. 1981; Wallerstein 
1976; Chase-Dunn 1998). Marxist political economists’ studies have also empha-
sized the illusory benefits of industrial development on the Southern periphery, 
arguing that technological transformation plays a pivotal role in the reproduction 
of core–periphery relationships (Arrighi 1990; Brenner 2006; Roberts 2016).
Our analysis is based on a notion of uneven and combined development which 
resembles these structuralists’ concepts. We want to understand how uneven 
global distribution of state of the art technologies contribute to the reproduc-
tion of core–periphery relationships. Vernon’s product life-cycle theory (1966) 
on standardization demonstrates how the introduction of innovative technologies 
devalues existing production processes by diminishing their capacity for creating 
value. Such devaluation affects not only production processes, but also forms of 
labor organization and the rates of return on older technologies still in operation.
According to Vernon’s theory, the constant pressure of devaluation means that 
transfers of technology do not automatically result in upgraded production proc-
esses. Even switching a production line over to a new model can accelerate the life 
cycle of the given product and push it into decline—a process which tends to be 
ignored by proponents of the theory of upgrading (Gereffi – Korzeniewicz 1994; 
Henderson et al. 2002; Gereffi et al. 2005; Bair 2005; Gereffi 2014; Baldwin et al. 
2014).The latter concentrate on one particular segment of the production process 
or on one particular model, the transfer of which they understand as a dynamic 
improvement in the technological endowments of the given production facility. 
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The advantage of Vernon’s theory is that it encompasses both technological shifts 
and the reorganization of entire production processes, including spatial relocation 
and the reproduction of geographical hierarchies within the division of labor. One 
disadvantage of this theory is that it was initially applied only to US-based firms, 
and thus generally neglected questions of ownership. We have therefore modified 
Vernon’s product life-cycle theory by incorporating it into a framework including 
GVC and GPN theories. In our framework, the links between Vernon’s theory and 
the GVC/GPN approaches are the different forms of economic rent which various 
players extract over the course of a product’s life cycle.
The important contribution of GVC/GPN theorists to the analysis of global 
dependencies is their focus on the ownership structure of the supply chain; their 
approaches are also useful for analyzing modes of organizing labor and the rela-
tionships between production and regulation (Sturgeon – Van Biesebroeck 2011; 
Smith 2015). In applying GVC and GPN theories, we also incorporate Vernon’s 
notions about the role of technology in the production process. As we noted above, 
the weakness of the theory of upgrading espoused by GVC/GPN scholars is that 
it neglects the uneven and contradictory effects new technologies have on the 
production process as a whole. We have used this synthetic approach—including 
elements of the GVC/GPN frameworks and Vernon’s product life-cycle theory—
to examine the automotive industry in CEE because that is where international 
car assemblers have been expanding their production capacity.
The rest of this paper consists of three further sections. In section 2 following 
this introduction, we explain how technological transformation makes vertical 
specialization possible through relocation. To demonstrate this we analyze the 
relationship between the declining phase of the combustion engine’s life cycle 
and the more advanced standardization in the development of electric engines. In 
section 3, we highlight the effects of the relocation of European, mostly German, 
automotive companies on (1) labor productivity and capital intensity, (2) modes 
of labor organization and value capture, in short: on the results of vertical special-
ization. And finally, in our concluding remarks, we highlight that core–periphery 
relationships are reproduced by new forms of vertical specialization in the auto-
motive value chain.
2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION 
AND GEOGRAPHICAL RELOCATION
In order to understand the effects that vertical specialization in the European au-
tomotive value chains have had on Central and Eastern European countries, we 
need to look at the forces behind industrial relocation. When profit prospects for 
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combustion engines became bleak in the 1990s, standardized mass production 
was transferred to new geographical locations. Since the end of the 2000s another 
major impetus has been the standardization of the production of electric engines, 
which has helped push the combustion engine further into the mature phase of its 
life cycle. In this paper we focus on post-2008 developments, since when CEE 
countries’ vertical specialization in the European automotive value chains has 
targeted the production of the latter engine type, and therefore the position these 
economies occupy is increasingly limited to the lower end of the value chain.
As an analytical starting point, we combine Vernon’s product life-cycle the-
ory (Vernon 1966) with the GVC/GPN framework. This helps us connect the 
different stages of product development to the changing profit conditions cre-
ated by the process of standardization. In each stage of product development, 
companies seek new strategies to extract various forms of rent from the value-
creation process (Henderson et al. 2002: 448–449; Kaplinsky 1998): monopoly 
rent, technological rent and exploitation rent. The source of the monopoly rent 
comes from the fact that the product in concern has no substitutive alternative 
due to its pioneering introduction in the market. The source of the technology 
rent stems from technological standardization that helps to bring down produc-
tion costs. Although all forms of rent include some sorts of exploitation in a 
capitalist system, it is the exploitative rent which makes the extraction and ex-
ploitation of material resources intensified when technological innovation is not 
enough or over-exhausted to solve the problem of competitive pressure or the 
simultaneous overproduction crises. Exploitative rent is the resource-seeking 
solution to the exhaustion of the other forms of rent by either intensifying the 
labor process or by relocating production closer to material resources, including 
cheap labor.
In the first stage of Vernon’s model, when a new product is introduced com-
mercially, the market price has less to do with initial production costs than with 
the monopoly position that the pioneering producer has achieved in its market 
niche. During the early phase of product development, companies are better able 
to afford high expenditures on innovations because their costs can be covered by 
this monopoly rent.
In the second stage, when new competitors enter the market, the standardiza-
tion of production processes transforms the type of rent to be extracted. Monopoly 
rents evaporate as escalating competition puts downward pressure on both prices 
and profits. In this stage, production costs tend to determine prices. In order to 
sustain their rates of profit, companies must find technologically innovative ways 
to standardize their production processes. Their rents are almost directly associat-
ed with the degree of standardization they achieve. Any advances in its processes 
of standardization will allow a company to reap extra benefits without changing 
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prices—at least until their innovative technologies are emulated by competitors. 
This source of profit, technological rent, cannot be sustained over the long run if 
competition intensifies.
During the standardized stage of production, profits come under increasing 
pressure and price competition will ultimately regulate the market. When stand-
ardization cannot be intensified at the same speed with which competition is ac-
celerating, the material costs of production, including raw materials and labor, 
become the most important arenas for price competition. In this sort of competi-
tive environment, companies are encouraged to seek new strategies, such as geo-
graphical relocations of the standardized segments of their production processes. 
This leads to the final stage of the product life cycle, in which a third type of rent 
arises from strategies like geographical relocation. We call this exploitative rent.
Nevertheless, product development and the geographical division of produc-
tion are not necessarily directly related to core–periphery relationships. Before 
they are integrated into standardized production systems, important technologi-
cal innovations are fostered in various locations irrespective of the host country’s 
position in the international division of labor. In fact, domestic start-ups and 
garage firms all over the world conduct some of the most important technologi-
cal experiments in the early stages of product development. A new division of 
labor emerges as production is adapted to standardized production systems. In 
addition, the geographical extension of production accelerates as larger multina-
tionals acquire such technologies and integrate them into their established pro-
duction networks.
The structural hierarchy of production, therefore, crystallizes only when 
a product’s development reaches the final stage. It is only when standardized 
production is relocated to a new geographical region that companies are able to 
generate exploitative rents. The more standardized the production process of a 
given product becomes, the more likely its production is to be relocated to the 
periphery. Thus the hierarchical, core–periphery structure of a production process 
crystallizes not at the beginning of a product’s life cycle, but as the culmination 
of its standardization.
In the following, we expand Vernon’s single product model to cover two sub-
stitute products. Even in the case of a single product in the standardized stage, 
its price cannot drop at a continuous rate if improvements in the scale efficiency 
of its production slow down. Thus, despite continuous downward pressure on 
prices, the speed at which they fall decreases over time. Thus for two substitute 
products, each of which may be in a different stage of its life cycle, the price 
process described above results in a price convergence which accelerates over the 
long run. Therefore, at a later stage of development, the competition between the 
two substitute products will intensify.
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For incumbent companies facing growing price competition in a market for 
substitute products, this raises two questions. First, to which product will the 
company allocate more of its limited investment and development funds? And 
second, how will it reorganize the production process for the product with bleaker 
prospects for technological rents in the more standardized phase of its life cycle? 
The mechanism through which the two substitute products’ life cycles interact 
in a price competition is the allocation of investment funds, which follows the 
shifts from one form of rent to another. More funds tend to be allocated to the 
less-mature product with higher expected returns on technological investments, 
leaving less capital to be put into the standardized product with the declining rate 
of return. In both cases, we see an acceleration of such interaction processes. The 
more funds are allocated to a product in the process of standardization, the faster 
its standardization proceeds. At the same time, as less capital remains to be in-
vested in the standardized product, the faster such a product tends to decline into 
the final stage of its life cycle. For the less-mature product, this process will bring 
an acceleration of its standardization, while the product already in the standard-
ized stage will move rapidly toward a market exit. In the latter case, companies 
can still slow down this exit process, and thus minimize their losses on previ-
ous investments by pushing down material costs and seeking exploitative rents 
through strategies like geographical relocation, as described above.
In case of the geographical relocation of the automotive industry, we find an 
underlying interaction between the life cycles of the combustion engine, which 
is in its standardized phase, and the electric engine, which is now in the process 
of rapid standardization. We assume that the combustion engine originally had 
a stronger and more direct influence on companies’ investment strategies than 
did the development of the electric engine. The direction of influence, however, 
has changed over time. As the standardization of the less mature electric engine 
proceeds, while the more standardized combustion engine moves toward ‘over-
maturity,’ with very little room for further development, investment has begun 
to shift toward the former. The electric engine, as it enters its more standardized 
phase, tends to attract more and more of a company’s limited investment funds, 
effectively drawing them away from the combustion engine. We can see the evo-
lution of the cost and energy density of electric batteries in Figure 2; the average 
cost of an electric battery tends to fall as its efficiency gradually increases.
Even though electric cars have only recently become available commercially, 
the early stages of their product life cycle stretch back to the 1920s, just after the 
revolutionary innovation of the moving assembly line, which Henry Ford first 
installed in 1913. The initial stage of the electric car’s life cycle lingered on for 
almost a century because the prospects for its development were determined by 
the life cycle of the combustion engine or Otto motor. Despite the existence of 
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several prototypes, none of these electric models reached the stage of standard-
ized production,3 largely because of Ford’s revolutionary innovations in the pro-
duction of combustion engines a decade earlier. The rapid standardization of the 
Ford model attracted a great deal of investment, kick-starting a boom in the life 
cycle of the Otto motor. It took less than a decade for this model to conquer the 
US and world markets, and even today, the widespread standardization of electric 
models is still largely dependent on the evolution of the Otto motor’s life cycle. In 
other words, the standardization of electric-car production will speed up when the 
life cycle of the Otto motor approaches its end. Although this process has begun 
to accelerate since the oil-price shocks of the 1970s (at which point the Otto mo-
tor reached the stage of maturity), there is still a long road ahead (Figure 3).
The world economic crisis of 2009 seems to have accelerated the movement of 
the combustion engine into the declining phase of its life cycle. One consequence 
has been that companies in the European automotive value chain have acceler-
ated the relocation of their production to CEE in hopes of generating exploitative 
rents. Returns on technological investments—those aimed at super-standardiza-
tion and efficiency gains, especially in the downsizing of diesel engines—have 
dropped to historically low levels. As a result, returns on investments aimed at 
improving electric cars’ efficiency tend to threaten companies that lag behind 
3  Several attempts have been made to develop plug-in electric and hybrid cars, most of which 
have failed to gain adequate market share. See the examples of Tucker in the 1940s, DeLorean 
in the 1970s, and Fisker Automotive in the 2000s.
Figure 2. Electric battery cost and battery energy density
Source: Shanan (2016).
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in this technological transformation.4 We assume that the standardization of the 
mass production of electric engines has been underway since the aftermath of 
the 2009 crisis.5 However, because of the influence investments in electric and 
combustion engines have on each other, OEMs’ attempts to continue generating 
returns on their investments in the sinking combustion segment create strong tail-
winds for relocation. Some of these investments might still turn a profit if produc-
tion is relocated to regions where value can be created by generating exploitative 
rents. Peripheral economies, including CEE are among the best possible choices 
for expanding the production of standardized models that are moving toward the 
ends of their life cycles because of the low cost of material inputs there, most 
notably cheap labor.
4  A global survey conducted by KPMG found that a majority of responding managers of OEMs 
in the US, EU, and Japan had shifted their investment priorities away from the efficiency gains 
of downsizing combustion engines and started allocating more funds to innovation in electric 
and hybrid fuel systems (KPMG 2015: 17).
5  The emergence of Tesla’s Model 3 and the growing number of technological innovations 
introduced by traditional OEMs—such as Renault-Nissan’s Leaf, BMW’s i3, and GM’s Chev-
rolet Bolt—provide evidence for an increasingly intense interaction between the life cycles of 
the two substitute engines. Major German OEMs have lagged behind in this transformation, 
possibly as a result of the more traditional governance structure of their value chains. Very re-
cently, however, both Daimler and VW have launched massive, multi-billion-dollar initiatives 
in hopes of catching up in this fiercely competitive race. See, for instance, Daimler’s ‘Ecolux 
project’ and VW’s ‘Together-Strategy 2025.’
Figure 3. Market share of fuel types for newly registered cars in the EU, 2011–2014
Source: authors, based on ACEA and BMI database.
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3. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF VERTICAL SPECIALIZATION 
IN THE EUROPEAN AUTOMOTIVE VALUE CHAIN
As a result of vertical specialization in the automotive industry, both the share 
of CEE in global automotive production and the industry’s share in these econo-
mies’ manufacturing output (Table 1) have been climbing steadily since the mid-
dle of the 1990s. As we have demonstrated in section one, since about the end of 
the 2000s, this relocation has been driven largely by the accelerating standardiza-
tion of electric-engine production and the consequent shift of the combustion en-
gine—the production of which CEE has specialized in—into the declining stage 
of its life cycle. In this second section, we analyze how this automotive-industry 
relocation has affected the social and economic relations both in and between 
Western Europe, especially Germany and Central and Eastern Europe in the fol-
lowing areas: (1) labor productivity and capital intensity and (2) modes of labor 
organization and capturing value.
Table 1. Share of CEE in global automotive manufacturing
 
Number of vehicles 
produced
Share of countries in CEE and global automobile 
manufacturing
1000 units
CEE = 
100%
Global = 
100%
Global = 
100%
2000 2017 2000 2017 2000 2017
Germany 5,525 5,646 81.2% 62.2% 9.5% 7.7%
Czech Republic 456 1,414 6.7% 15.6% 0.8% 1.9%
Poland 505 515 7.4% 5.7% 0.9% 0.7%
Slovakia 182 1,002 2.7% 11.0% 0.3% 1.4%
Hungary 137 502 2.0% 5.5% 0.2% 0.7%
Aggregate 6,805 9,079 100.0% 100.0% 11.7% 12.4%
Global Aggregate 58,374 73,457   100.0% 0.0%
Source: OICA database.
3.1. Labor productivity and capital intensity
To understand the hierarchical nature of the automotive industry, we need to ana-
lyze labor productivity and capital intensity in various phases of the production 
process. For this purpose, we use world-systems scholars’ definition of the core–
periphery relationship: ‘a continuous variable between constellations of econom-
ic activities which vary in terms of their average relative levels of capital intensity 
versus labor intensity’ (Chase-Dunn 1998: 207). Capital intensity means a high 
level of investment in non-standardized, i.e. relatively monopolistic spheres of 
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production that usually erect barriers to prevent competitors from entering the 
market. Thus, high capital intensity also means monopoly rents and a relatively 
high proportion of skilled workers. On the other end of the theoretical spectrum, 
we find more standardized activities with declining productivity rates and a rel-
atively larger share of unskilled labor, which we regard as the labor-intensive 
segment of the market. It is important to note that the terms of this analytical 
dichotomy cannot be used to describe any particular activity over a long period 
of time as the profile of any of such activity is prone to change due to the process 
of standardization. What we regard as a capital-intensive activity with high labor 
productivity on the day a product is introduced will soon be transformed into a 
more standardized, labor-intensive activity.
We turn our focus to the European automotive value chains to identify aspects 
of a core–periphery relationship among the various activities in the production 
process. In the West, center of production, specialization occurs in product de-
velopment and other capital-intensive activities, e.g., producing special machine 
tools in the service of mass production (Krzywdzinski 2014: 6). The production 
of such machinery requires a relatively large proportion of highly qualified work-
ers for whom there is competition in the labor market. Technological innovation 
associated with product development is usually also retained in the headquarters 
under the strict control of OEMs and tier-1 firms’ global operations. The R&D 
activities relocated to the Central and Eastern European countries, on the other 
hand, assure that local suppliers will be able to keep up with the uninterrupted 
flow of technological adaptations.6 Therefore, R&D does not necessarily corre-
spond with real product development.7 Differing modes of specialization in the 
automotive industry can make spectacular differences in the productivity of a 
local economy (Figure 4). Moreover, available information on export portfolios 
also suggests that none of the Central and Eastern European countries have spe-
cialized in the production of goods and activities associated with product devel-
opment or trade linkages to the ‘upstream’ segment of the value chain. Instead, as 
is also stressed by the IMF (2013: 3), a large proportion of foreign value-added 
6  These adjustments are necessitated by periodical model upgrades in already established lines 
of production. One recent example is the transfer of Audi’s Q3 model to the Hungarian VW-
plant in Győr between 2016 and 2018. Four models were previously assembled there: the 
TT Coupe, TT Roadster, A3 Limousine, and Cabrio. These models became outdated as they 
reached the midpoint of a medium-sized car’s average life cycle, which industry experts esti-
mate at 6 years. After a model reaches middle age, its sales tend to drop, a process catalyzed 
for some of these vehicles by the 2015 diesel scandal (Portfolio 2016). 
7  In our analyses the relocation of R&D is not a reliable measure of economic development. 
As some individual cases suggest companies can account for R&D activities only because of 
special tax credits or other financial incentives.
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content in a country’s total volume of exports indicates that it is a ‘downstream’ 
participant in the supply chain, usually specializing in processing and assembly 
functions.
Although the modes of vertical specialization in CEE differ somewhat, the 
overall tendency toward a stagnant environment—one which produces little 
growth in value added—applies to all the countries under investigation here. We 
argue that there is no clear link between the growth of the industry’s share in CEE 
economies and improvements in their capacity to produce value added. In fact, an 
inverse relationship applies when domestic value added by local production di-
minishes and can then be compensated for only by larger volumes of output.8 Be-
tween 1995 and 2011, the share of domestic value added in gross exports dropped 
by 15 to 20 percent in each of the CEE countries despite their tendency to show 
increases in nominal export volumes. The region’s increases in foreign value add-
ed are related to the growth of German value added in both nominal and relative 
terms (IMF 2013: 11). As noted by Cieślik (2014) CEE countries’ growing share 
8  The gross value added share in the automotive industrial output is extremely low in the CEE 
countries because of the strong import demand in the production. One notable example is Hun-
gary where the production of one additional unit of gross value added in the automotive indus-
try generates 3.22 additional units in the country’s total imports (Kazimir et al. 2016: 10).
Figure 4. Labor productivity (Gross Value Added/employment) in the automotive industry 
in Germany and CEE (in euros)
Source: Eurostat.
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of foreign value added in their total exports indicates a deteriorating position in 
the global value chain, i.e., with respect to downstream market segments.
More thorough statistics highlight the fact that such specialization does not 
always result in complementarities; the overall trend suggests an incoherently 
integrated intra-regional division of labor. Export statistics on product portfolios 
differentiate between two forms of specialization: supplying intermediate goods 
and assembling final goods (Molnár 2012; Kopint 2011). Incoherence arises as a 
result of parallel and competing activities that depend on commands from Western 
headquarters. Vertical specializations involve activities in which the West exports 
intermediate goods to be processed in downstream facilities in CEE, then re-ex-
ported directly or indirectly to the rest of the world (IMF 2013: 12). In Slovakia, 
for example, semi-final assembly dominates export activity, whereas in the Czech 
Republic there is a more balanced combination of final-product assembly and the 
supplying of parts. Interestingly, the supply of important intermediate goods for 
further processing elsewhere seems to dominate the Hungarian and Polish export 
portfolios (Ambroziak 2016: 36).
Because the process of standardization induces relocation, one of the most 
important export products of CEE automotive industries is the combustion en-
gine (diesel and gasoline). The VW group, the biggest automotive investor in 
all the CEE countries, had already relocated much of the production of these 
engines to CEE even before the diesel scandal began to haunt it, which suggests 
that the combustion engine has been in the final phase of its life cycle for some 
time. The restructuring of the production process induced by this scandal and the 
consequent relocation of various models provide further evidence of this type of 
vertical specialization. According to Krzywdzinski (2008), the direct relocation 
of production has not resulted in an East–West division of labor, but rather in the 
renegotiation of product allocation to various European sites, which usually takes 
place with each new generation of products. In 2016, Audi (part of the VW group) 
decided to outfit its Brussels plant for the production of electric cars and transfer 
its older A1 models from Belgium to the Martorell plant in Spain. Audi’s Q3 
model, formerly produced at the Spanish factory, was then transferred to Győr, 
Hungary as a part of the process of model upgrades described above. General 
Motors’ Opel division, the only other manufacturer of engines in Hungary, also 
recently upgraded its motor fabrication plant in Szentgotthárd (see Figure 5). In 
2015, Audi’s plant in Győr was the single biggest engine factory in the world.
Similar restructuring has occurred in Daimler’s Mercedes division. The core 
factory in Bremen has been dedicated to the future production of electric cars, 
whereas the production of older models of compact (B-class) and sub-compact 
cars is being relocated to its newly built engine plant in Jawor, Poland and its 
expanded body plant in Kecskemét, Hungary. 
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The reorganizational pressure stems from the changing network relations 
inside the value chain which can ultimately lead to changes in the governance 
structure (Kaplinsky 2005). Conflicts usually arise when lead firms attempt to 
protect their core competencies while major suppliers attempt to upgrade their 
position in the value chain. This is exactly what is happening in the automotive 
industry due to the above described technological transformation. One reason is 
that traditional OEMs lagged substantially behind major assembler in developing 
electric batteries which constitute a separate technological part of the engine. The 
major suppliers of these batteries are giant South Korean and Japanese corpora-
tions, including Panasonic, LG Chem, Samsung and the Chinese BYD which is 
uniquely a brand manager with its own developed batteries. Chinese manufactur-
ers will be in a position to bring competitive electric automobiles to the market 
to a growing extent partly due to the state support. In reaction, OEMs such as 
BMW and VW, including Audi launched initiatives to catch up and develop their 
own battery production in fear of losing competitive advantage and market posi-
tion over those independent suppliers who could achieve dominance in the value 
chain if the need for electric batteries will rise. Nonetheless, network relations 
among firms impact countries in which they reside (Humphrey 2000). CEE pro-
duction will presumably be specialized even more in standardized manufacturing 
concerning e.g. batteries for European car production. It is, however, a matter of 
further research to what extent the origin of the producer – whether European or 
non-European – makes a difference for dependency (cf. Bartlett – Seleny 1998).
Figure 5. Engine production in Hungary, 1992–2016 (per 1000 unit)
Source: authors, based on company reports.
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3.2. Modes of labor organization and value capture
Both the various forms of labor organization and the different positions local 
companies take in global value chains are determined by core–periphery relation-
ship. One notable result of relocation is that wages tend to lag behind labor pro-
ductivity (Krzywdzinski 2008: 14; Cieślik 2014; Drahokoupil – Piasna 2018; see 
Figure 6). The source of exploitative rent is thus the constant gap between wages 
and productivity in the European automotive value chain. Profit consolidation 
presupposes this gap and results in sharply contrasting modes of labor organiza-
tion in the West and in CEE. Despite higher unit labor costs, the high-road model 
in Western Europe benefits from cutting-edge technological innovations that help 
it to sustain high levels of productivity (Jürgens – Meissner 2005: 15). In addi-
tion, the protection of this model includes concessions in which lower-paying, 
lower-quality work is relocated to lower-wage countries.
As Krzywdzinski has demonstrated with regard to the supplier segment, la-
bor-intensive mass production with relatively low skill requirements has almost 
completely disappeared from Germany; the standardized production of spare 
parts and components has also been affected by relocation. The recent drop in the 
number of blue-collar workers has contributed to a re-structuring of the whole 
Figure 6. Gap between productivity and unit labor costs in the automotive industry in CEE 
countries (average) compared to Germany (100%)
Source: Eurostat.
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German workforce.9 Losses caused by relocation have been counterbalanced 
by successful specialization in premium, high-tech, and high-quality products 
(Krzywdzinski 2014: 15).
Labor-market conditions for semi-skilled labor in CEE are already marked by 
intense competition and insecurity. The labor market consists of flexible fixed-
term contractors, a largely non-unionized labor force, and temporary agency 
workers10 who can be easily integrated into production lines during reorganiza-
tions and model upgrades and whose employment is thus the most sensitive to 
the business cycles (Tardos – Piroska 2015; Meszmann 2016; Gerőcs et al. 2018; 
Drahokoupil –Piasna 2018). Job security is generally limited to a thin stratum of 
the workforce. 
The core–periphery relationship in the vertical specialization also circum-
scribes a firm’s position in the automotive value chain, i.e. its ability to capture 
value. According to Henderson et al. (2002: 449), ‘it is one thing for value to be 
created and enhanced in given locations, but it may be quite another for it to be 
captured for the benefit of those locations’. The possibility of value capture in a 
local context is determined by property relations and the value chain’s govern-
ance structure.
Assessing property relations involves analyzing the number and strength of 
TNCs vis-à-vis domestic firms both inside the value chain and in a local econo-
my. The property structures of the CEE automotive industry are characterized by 
a surprisingly high level of concentration, which has tended to grow over time 
(Kopint-Tárki 2008). Foreign corporations with a global presence dominate the 
value-chain hierarchy from the top level—lead firms or OEMs—down to the 
mid-bottom of tier-2.11 Companies with significant domestic ownership of opera-
tions above tier-2 are very rare in the CEE countries. In fact, the share of domestic 
suppliers is decreasing even among tier-3 firms in some of the countries under 
consideration. In Hungary, for instance, the Hungarian Central Statistical Office’s 
database shows that the number of domestic companies in the automotive indus-
try decreased from 98 to 63 between 1998 and 2015. Similar trends are at work in 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia. As Pavlínek (2015) has shown, this declining 
share of domestic suppliers in the value chain has had a significant impact on 
overall economic development. TNCs in the Czech and Slovakian automotive in-
 9  Low-skill production with no educational requirements—e.g., the assembly of wire-harness 
systems and the simple, high-volume production of automobile seats—was the first to be 
removed from Germany to low-wage countries (Krzywdzinski 2014).
10  Volkswagen’s share of temporary agency workers, for instance, is about 10–20% of its EE 
workforce, compared to an average of 2% at its German sites (Krzywdzinski 2008: 13). 
11  In Hungary, for instance, around 90% of the assets in the industry are foreign owned (Kopint-
Tárki 2008: 48).
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dustries have reacted differently to the economic downturn, responding with dif-
ferent employment policies and making much greater use of profit repatriation.
The governance structure of the European automotive value chain reflects the 
hierarchies inherent in vertical specialization. The profitability crisis in the au-
tomotive industry has forced lead firms at the top of the value chain to delegate 
tasks and competencies that have been devalued as a result of standardization, 
and thus the possibility of capturing value has changed accordingly. Companies 
at lower levels in the chain face growing costs because new competencies have 
been delegated to them. Companies that are unable to perform these new tasks 
lose their positions in the chain and are forced either to leave the market or to re-
position themselves at lower levels. Profits are thus distributed unevenly over the 
length of the value chain.
Tier-3 firms have suffered most from the profitability crisis. On the one hand, 
tier-3 companies tend to improve their capabilities by developing financial and 
technological dependencies on their higher-level partners (Pavlínek – Janák 2007). 
On the other hand, growing costs and intensifying competition have made value 
capture more and more difficult; the resulting pressure has forced many tier-3 
companies to exit the market, which has contributed to the growing concentra-
tion of foreign ownership in local property structures. The governance structure 
at the lower levels of the value chain has become captive and hierarchical, with 
rigid dependencies and growing price competition. The effects of this pressure, 
such as low profitability and difficulties in capturing value, have not been distrib-
uted evenly, even among tier-3 companies. In the captive structure, foreign TNCs 
and their domestic suppliers are affected differently. Despite growing pressure, 
TNCs can still generate exploitative rents. Domestic suppliers, who are typically 
trapped at tier-3, have limited access to technological innovations and financial 
resources, and therefore remain financially more dependent on their higher-level 
partners to cover the costs of the technological and labor investments they will 
need to make in order to master new competencies, carry out new tasks, and 
capture value (Kopint-Tárki 2008: 49). When competition intensifies, they face a 
greater risk of bankruptcy.
As our empirical findings on the unevenness of capital intensity and labor 
productivity and value capture in value-chain specialization have demonstrated, 
core–periphery relations are not undone by the expansion of automotive value 
chains. On the contrary, vertical specialization in value chains is induced by 
similar global economic forces, such as technological transformation, that have 
historically been responsible for uneven development and uneven exchanges be-
tween core and peripheral countries. The difference now is that these hierarchical 
structures are more embedded in global production networks which also produce 
new geographical scope for interstate relations. This does not mean, however, 
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that core–periphery is no longer relevant in the East and West relationship. In 
fact, companies on the top of the value chain hierarchy have remained geographi-
cally concentrated in Western Europe, most notably in Germany, whereas those 
who specialized in standardized activities have transferred production to Eastern 
Europe. As a conclusion, we find it accurate to apply the dependency theory not 
only in the interstate relations but also with respect to vertical specialization in 
value chains. Even though these two levels of the international division of labor 
are neither the same – as the logic of specialization, e.g. technological or labor 
processes affect states and interfirm connections in a different way – nor neutral 
to each other, but overlap to the extent that core–periphery relations have been 
reproduced by them.
4. CONCLUSIONS
We have argued in this paper that vertical specialization in the automotive value 
chains was one of the dominant forms in which core–periphery relationships re-
appeared between CEE and Western Europe, most notably Germany. One major 
force behind such specialization has been an unfolding technological transforma-
tion in the production of automotive engines since the economic crisis in 2008. 
The standardization of electric engines and batteries, along with the subsequent 
over-maturity of the combustion engine—the production of which CEE coun-
tries have specialized in—has provided a framework for the core–periphery rela-
tionship apparent in these production processes. This vertical specialization has 
had notable consequences for (1) labor productivity and capital intensity, and 
(2) modes of labor organization and capturing value. Although we have empha-
sized the core–periphery relationship that governs patterns of vertical specializa-
tion in automotive value chains (which we regard as a crucial aspect of dependen-
cy), we believe that an understanding of the complex nature of the core–periphery 
relationship will require the elaboration of several other aspects of the global 
economy. These include investigations of external finances (Gerőcs – Pinkasz 
2018), labor conditions in semi-peripheral positions in the international division 
of labor, and in the local context, class relations and the role of the state.
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